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THE ISSUE 
The United States is the European Union’s most important trade and bilateral 
investment partner, which has, until now, supported a multilateral trade system and 
European integration and has provided a security guarantee to the countries of the EU. 
But like other advanced economies, the US’s relative weight in the global economy has 
declined. The new US administration seems intent on replacing multilateralism with 
bilateral deals. In trade, it aims to secure new trade deals in order to reduce bilateral 
trade deficits and to protect, in particular, the US manufacturing sector. In climate 
policy, the US commitment to the Paris Agreement is being questioned. In defence, the 
security umbrella appears less certain than previously. The overall promise behind this 
change of direction is to put ‘America first’ and deliver better results for US citizens.
POLICY CHALLENGE 
The EU is a relatively open economy and has benefited from the multilateral system. If 
the US does change from its previous course, the EU should respond with a four-part 
strategy: (1) Collaborate with partners around the world in defence of the World Trade 
Organisation; (2) Establish deeper economic relations with China and other partners; 
in particular, the EU should accelerate discussions on the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
with China while safeguarding its interests and favouring public courts for dispute 
settlement; (3) Reform EU trade governance and address internal imbalances, to 
increase the EU’s external credibility. Moreover, strengthening Europe’s social model 
would provide a response to protectionist temptations; (4) Prepare tools that could be 
deployed bilaterally against the US, including WTO-compatible anti-subsidy measures 
and possible tax measures.
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INTRODUCTION
From Europe’s perspective, the world 
in 2017 looks very different to how it 
looked just one year ago. But despite 
significant upsets resulting from elec-
tions and/or referendums, not all of the 
changes that are taking place are breaks 
from previously-trodden paths. Some 
are continuations of previous trends that 
have now become more visible or more 
entrenched.
One major trend, which started some 
20 years ago, is the diminishing relative 
economic importance of advanced 
countries. This trend became evident 
around 2010, when advanced countries 
started to account for less than half of 
global GDP in purchasing power terms.
This reduction in economic 
importance is associated with so-called 
diminished giant syndrome, otherwise 
known as the curse of declinism. Previous 
world hegemons pursue “myopic and 
self-indulgent … ‘what’s in it for us’ 
economic policies in the world arena”, 
which end up undermining their roles as 
world leaders¹.
In the case of the United States this 
trend emerged during the Clinton 
administration (1993-2001), when the 
question of “what’s in it for us?” first arose 
in terms of “regaining competitiveness”. 
Donald Trump’s victory in November 
2016 seems to have made this principle 
into the underpinning of all the new 
administration’s policies. 
Other advanced economies have 
also seen their shares in global trade 
and income decline, leading to calls for 
protectionism. The European Union 
remains unsure about its role in the 
world, not least in terms of its security 
and its ability to do new trade deals. 
Brexit will diminish the EU’s size and 
possibly its trade and security influence. 
By contrast, China’s position in the 
world has strengthened during the last 
20-25 years. President Xi Jinping’s speech 
in Davos in January 2017² was more like 
that of a ‘growing giant’ and reminiscent 
of presidents’ speeches calling for an 
open global economic system during the 
heyday of US hegemony. 
However, Trump’s election also 
marks a break from trends in terms of 
the US’s world role in defence, trade and 
spreading of cultural values. Importantly, 
the current administration does not 
only aim to reduce the US’s role as an 
anchor of the global multilateral system, 
it may be on course to openly challenge 
it, either by threatening to withdraw 
from it unilaterally or by imposing 
protectionist measures, such as high 
tariffs. Culturally, the US may draw back 
from liberal values. Meanwhile, the US’s 
military commitment to NATO is being 
questioned. The underlying rationale of 
“what’s in it for us?” is well captured by 
President Trump’s ‘America first’ rhetoric.
In this paper, we consider what the 
EU’s strategic reaction should be to US 
diminishing giant policies, and the EU’s 
role in a world of declining hegemons 
and shifting balances. We start by 
exploring the geopolitical reasons for the 
new US administration’s ‘America first’ 
orientation. We then discuss the central 
elements of the emerging US policies and 
possible consequences for Europe. Lastly, 
we discuss how Europe should respond, 
how it could sustain a multilateral system 
and what partnerships it could build. 
Our focus is on the economic aspects but 
cultural and security aspects also play 
central roles in the broader picture.
WHAT LAYS BEHIND TRUMP’S 
‘AMERICA FIRST’ APPROACH?
Since the second world war, the US has 
played a clear leadership role in building, 
supporting and policing the global sys-
tem. This sense of responsibility for main-
taining the world order was supported by 
a view that it was beneficial to the US.
This view is not shared by the newly 
elected US president. On the contrary, 
President Trump argues that the 
rules-based multilateral system has 
not benefitted US citizens, and in fact 
has hurt them. While this view was 
not necessarily shared by the majority 
of Americans in the election, it was 
shared by a sufficient number to make a 
difference.
There are two versions of this 
argument. The first is that the multilateral 
system has benefitted foreign countries 
1. Quote from Bhagwati, J.N 
(1993) ‘The Diminished 
Giant Syndrome’, Foreign 
Affairs Vol 72.
2. See https://www.weforum.
org/agenda/2017/01/full-
text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-
at-the-world-economic-fo-
rum.
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at America’s expense. The second is that 
the possible benefits that the US might 
have enjoyed, deriving for instance from 
the dollar’s exorbitant privilege, accrue 
to Wall Street at the expense of Main 
Street – the multilateral system is seen as 
having favoured the financial sector at the 
expense of the manufacturing jobs that 
‘ordinary’ folk lost.
Supporting and protecting the 
multilateral system was politically easy for 
the US when it was considerably richer 
than the rest. However, as the level of 
income in the rest of the world increased, 
the US began to see other countries as 
competitors. China’s economic advance 
is a case in point. Chinese growth and its 
emergence as a major trading partner for 
the US have led to the belief that it is now 
a competitor and threatens US economic 
interests. The Trump administration’s 
view of Mexico and even Europe also fits 
this narrative³. 
The United States has experienced 
a long period during which real wages 
for most American citizens have not 
increased. The sense of unfairness has 
been reinforced by a welfare system in 
which healthcare expenditure has risen 
rapidly, leaving many citizens without 
protection⁴. Trump’s central argument 
to address these woes and to “make 
America great again” is to turn away from 
globalisation, while rejecting the notion of 
building a welfare state.
Trade, in particular in manufactured 
goods, is very much at the heart of 
Trump’s zero-sum view of international 
relations, and contrasts with the typical 
view of economists of trade as a positive-
sum game. Trump blames trade for 
the real wage stagnation observed 
primarily in manufacturing and intends 
to bring manufacturing jobs back to 
the US because they are supposedly 
highly paid⁵. A major theme of the 
presidential campaign was therefore 
about introducing protectionist measures 
to correct a system, which in the view of 
many Trump supporters led to the US 
trade deficit⁶.
THE CONTOURS OF TRUMP’S 
‘AMERICA FIRST’ POLICY
Trump’s ‘America first’ vision is thus very 
much about bringing back manufacturing 
jobs to the US. Clearly, there has been a 
big decline in US manufacturing employ-
ment since the 1970s. But this decline is 
part of a common trend in all advanced 
economies, rather than specific to the US 
(Figure 1). However, the US has always 
had the lowest share of manufacturing 
jobs during the past 40 years, compared to 
the main industrialised countries.
Figure 1: Employment in manufacturing, 
% of total employment
Sources: ILOSTAT, FRED. Notes: Total activity is from LFS where 
available, and from official estimates otherwise. Manufacturing is 
measured with Rev.4, otherwise Rev.3 or Rev.2 measures are used 
upon availability.
But high manufacturing employment 
shares do not necessarily correlate 
with trade surpluses. Japan, Germany 
(countries with persistent trade 
surpluses) and Italy (broadly in trade 
balance over time) currently have similar 
manufacturing shares in employment. 
Employment share differences rather 
suggest differences in specialisation. 
Moreover, there is little difference in wage 
levels in manufacturing and services in 
the US⁷. 
Nevertheless, it is correct that the trade 
balance at the margin can matter for the 
relative size of the manufacturing sector. 
If an economy is at full employment and 
increases its net exports, its tradable 
sector (or manufacturing sector) would 
increase. Manufacturing therefore has a 
zero-sum dimension, but this operates 
at the margin and cannot explain the 
long-term decline in employment in 
manufacturing.
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3. This zero-sum view of 
economic relations is not 
new. It was already part 
of the ‘diminished giants’ 
narrative in the 1990s 
when the US viewed Japan, 
rather than China, as the 
emerging threat. But it has 
certainly taken on a new 
dimension with Trump’s 
insistence on ‘America first’.
4. The recent introduction of 
Obamacare apparently was 
not enough to change the 
sentiment.
5. Navarro, Peter and Wilbur 
Ross (2016) ‘Scoring the 
Trump Economic Plan: 
Trade, Regulatory & Energy 
Policy Impacts’, mimeo.
6. Ibid.
7. Guntram Wolff (2017) 
‘Manufacturing in the US: 
Will Trump’s strategy re-
patriate highly-paid jobs?’ 
Bruegel Blog, 6 January.
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8. For an academic discus-
sion, see Auerbach, Alan, 
Michael P. Deveraux, Mi-
chael Keen and John Vella 
(2017) ‘Destination-Based 
Cash Flow Taxation, 
Oxford Univesity Centre 
for Business Taxation’, WP 
No. 1. For the proposal 
discussed by Republicans, 
see Mitchell, Daniel J. 
(2017) ‘Concerns About 
the ‘Border Adjustable’ Tax 
Plan From the House GOP, 
Part I’, Forbes, 3 January.
9. See Davies, Gavyn (2017) 
‘The Worrying macro-eco-
nomics of US border taxes’, 
Financial Times Blog, 15 
January; and Avi-Yonah, 
Reuven and Kimberly 
Clausing (2017) ‘Problems 
with Destination-Based 
Corporate Taxes and the 
Ryan Blueprint’, Law and 
Economics Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 16-029.
10. See Pomerleau, Kyle (2016) 
‘Exchange rates and the 
Border Adjustment’, Tax 
Foundation, 15 December 
The DBCFT can have ben-
efits in terms of promoting 
efficiency and would not 
distort trade if others also 
implemented it (Auerbach 
et al, 2017; see footnote 8).
11. The figure is based US Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis 
and data on manufacturing 
based on UN Comtrade 
and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, US Department 
of Commerce. Note: Man-
ufactured goods comprise 
sectors 5 to 8 (less 667 and 
68) of the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification 
(SITC Rev. 3). Manufac-
turing value added and 
gross output measures 
are, instead, based on the 
BEA industry economic 
accounts (based on 2007 
NAICS code structure). 
Since the former is prod-
uct-based, while the latter 
is sector-based, potential 
mismatches between the 
two classifications cannot 
be excluded.
One way Republicans in the House 
of Representatives have put forward 
to improve the US trade balance is 
through a ‘destination-based cash-
flow tax’ (DBCFT). This would impose 
a 20 percent tax on all imports, while 
providing a special tax exemption for 
income generated from exports⁸. Such an 
approach to taxation is known as ‘border 
adjustment’. 
The DBCFT would be levied on 
producers not consumers, and would 
act as a penalty on imports and as a 
subsidy for exports. Unlike a value added 
tax, it would therefore discriminate 
against foreign producers, and would 
(depending on its precise formulation) 
be incompatible with World Trade 
Organisation rules⁹. A levy on imports 
and a subsidy for exports would both 
increase the value of the dollar. A more 
expensive dollar would then counteract 
the benefits of this tax in terms of 
promoting exports and reducing imports. 
Whether the tax and the rise in the value 
of the dollar would totally offset one 
another remains a point of empirical 
debate because exchange rates are 
also affected by other factors¹⁰. DBCFT 
would generate significant tax revenues 
in countries with a trade deficit, like the 
US, while countries with trade surpluses 
would lose tax revenues.
Beyond taxes, President Trump 
appears also to see bilateral, rather 
than regional or multilateral, trade 
deals as the instrument of choice for 
promoting US interests. Bilateral deals, 
in his view, could maximise US leverage 
in negotiations. In particular, they are 
seen as the right approach to reduce 
trade deficits that supposedly destroy 
jobs. The figure on the front page of 
this Policy Brief¹¹ shows that the US 
has a trade deficit with most countries, 
certainly in goods and in particular in 
manufacturing. The biggest deficit is with 
China, followed by the EU and Mexico/
Japan. The trade deficit with EU countries 
is particularly high with Germany. 
However, the deficits are much smaller 
when measured on a value added basis.
CONSEQUENCES OF ‘AMERICA 
FIRST’ FOR GLOBAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT
The new US administration’s attempts to 
back-pedal on multilateral trade arrange-
ments will have profound implications 
for global trade and investment because 
of interlinkages between the US and its 
partners (see Tables 1 to 3).
As far as goods trade is concerned, 
the top five sources of US imports are, in 
descending order, China, the EU27 (the 
EU without the UK), Canada, Mexico 
and Japan. On the export side, the top 
five destinations are Canada, the EU27, 
Mexico, China and Japan.
For the EU27, the US is the number 
one destination for exports, just before 
China, and the number two source of 
imports, just behind China.
The close relationship between the 
EU27 and the US is even more intense 
for trade in services, where the EU27 and 
the US are each other’s largest export 
destination and import source.  
The close interconnectedness 
between the EU27 and the US is even 
more important as far as foreign direct 
investment stocks are concerned. Table 3 
shows that 44 percent of US’s FDI comes 
from the EU27, and 31 percent of the 
EU27 FDI comes from the US.
The EU reaction to possible US trade 
measures will depend on the size of the 
measures and their effects on the EU 
economy (as well as on geostrategic 
considerations to which we will return 
later). There are preliminary attempts to 
measure the effects of such actions¹² but 
the real effects will not be understood 
before US plans become clearer and the 
rest of world decides how to react.
HOW CAN THE EU DEFEND A 
MULTILATERAL SYSTEM?
Trump’s America first policy threatens to 
upset the global trading system and even 
put the WTO in danger. This will naturally 
precipitate reactions from other global 
players, and in particular the EU and 
China. 
The EU has a strong economic and 
political interest in preventing the 
demise of the multilateral trading system. 
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12. For preliminary esti-
mates of the impact of a 
Trump tariff on European 
employment and output, 
see Vandenbussche, Hylke, 
William Connell, Wouter 
Simons and Elena Zaurino 
(2017) ‘"America First!" 
What are the Job losses 
for Europe?’, KULeuven 
(VIVES) DP, 57 January.
Openness, measured as exports relative 
to a country’s GDP, is far greater in the EU 
(43.8 percent) than China (22.1 percent) 
or the US (12.6 percent).  The rules-based 
system allows all players, including 
the weaker ones, to trade with each 
other based on high and comparable 
standards that have to be followed by 
all. Protectionism would reduce EU and 
global welfare, hurt global growth and 
could mean lower standards and unfair 
competition. In particular, in the EU with 
its strong trade relationships around the 
world, many jobs could be at stake.
However, though the EU is the largest 
trading bloc in the world, it cannot 
sustain a strong multilateral system on its 
own. The EU’s inability to replace the US 
as a global hegemon is partly for internal 
reasons (the state of the economy, a 
weak defence and security policy) and 
partly for external reasons (the world 
balance has changed with the increasing 
economic relevance of China and other 
Table 1: Bilateral imports (goods) in 2015 for selected partners, (US$ billion)
US EU27 UK China Japan Mexico Canada
From
US . 249.4 58.1 150.5 68.3 187.3 223.2
EU27 376.5 . 340.0 190.4 64.8 41.4 40.9
UK 58.7 188.5 . 18.9 6.5 2.3 7.2
China 502.6 366.3 63.0 . 160.6 70.0 51.4
Japan 134.8 72.3 10.2 143.1 . 17.4 11.6
Mexico 297.5 21.2 2.1 10.1 4.8 . 24.4
Canada 301.0 18.7 10.7 26.3 9.2 9.9 .
World 2306.8 1978.8 630.3 1681.7 625.6 395.2 419.2
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade data (available here: https://comtrade.un.org/data/). Note: Bilateral trade relies on import statistics, 
which are considered more accurate given the customs system in place to collect tariff revenues.
Table 2: Bilateral imports (services) in 2014 for selected partners, (US$ billion)
  US EU27 UK China Japan Mexico Canada
From
US . 214.1 38.5 n.a. 57.9 n.a. 62.0
EU27 119.0 . 105.6 n.a. 23.2 n.a. 13.3
UK 49.8 160.0 . n.a. 12.6 n.a. 5.8
China 14.4 28.7 1.7 . 11.9 n.a. 2.1
Japan 31.2 15.9 4.3 n.a. . n.a. 2.0
Mexico 19.5 4.2 0.9 n.a. 0.3 . 2.4
Canada 30.1 12.4 2.8 n.a. 2.1 n.a. .
World 477.4 849.3 214.9 452.8 192.1 33.5 110.3
Source: Bruegel based on ITC Trade Map and OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services by partner country. Both sources follow the 
Extended Balance of Payments Services Classification (EBOPS 2010). Note: data on EU27 estimated by subtracting UK imports from all the 
bilateral import flows of EU28. In particular, EU27 (EU without the UK) total imports are equal to (EU28 total imports – UK total imports from 
ExtraEU28 + EU27 imports from UK).
Table 3: FDI stocks 2015, $ billions
US EU27 UK China* Japan Mexico Canada
From
US . 2156.3 433 116.6 51.6 222 280
EU27 1382.3 . 679.9 257.9 58.4 184.1 150
UK 484 1248.6 . 42.3 13.2 20.5 24.8
China* 25.9 97.1 20.6 . 8.4 3.8 26.7
Japan 411 115.3 67.7 180.7 . 13.4 15.9
Mexico 16.6 43.4 n.a. 0.1 0 . 1
Canada 269 214.3 34.4 15.8 1.2 28.1 .
World 3130 6863.6 1550 2580 171 509 555
Source: CDIS (Coordinated Direct Investment Survey), IMF. Note: * including Hong Kong.
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emerging countries).    
At the same time, all three leading 
global trade players have expanded the 
number of regional trade agreements. 
The world therefore is evolving from 
a multilateral system centred around 
the US into a more multipolar system 
resting on the three strong trading poles 
of China, the EU and the US, each with 
several bilateral and regional trading 
arrangements. This has been criticised as 
already undermining existing multilateral 
frameworks¹³. 
This raises two questions: whether 
the poles of the system are collectively 
interested in supporting at least the 
core of the existing multilateral system, 
and whether the EU and China are 
willing and able to jointly support the 
multilateral system as the US steps back 
from its central role.
While the EU and China each 
clearly has an interest in supporting 
the multilateral trading system, it is an 
open question whether they can act in a 
coordinated manner as the EU and the 
US have done in the past. This is not a 
trivial question because the European 
and Chinese economic systems are much 
more different from each other than 
the European and American economic 
systems. Nevertheless, in certain areas, 
such as support for the WTO, EU-China 
collaboration should be relatively 
straightforward. The EU should also 
seek other partners for collaboration in 
support of the WTO.
STEPPING UP TRADE RELATIONS 
WITH PARTNERS
Strategically, the EU should continue its 
bilateral trade and investment negotia-
tions with other partners. The bilateral 
deals should be designed as stepping 
stones rather than obstacles to the mul-
tilateral system, including in investment 
matters, where the ultimate goal could be 
an expansion of the WTO into a ‘WITO’ 
(to include investment) 
An obvious objective is to complete 
on-going bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) negotiations with China. But the EU 
differs most from China in terms of the 
role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in manufacturing. It is natural, therefore, 
that the role of SOEs is at the heart of the 
BIT negotiations that both the EU and 
the US are pursuing China. An additional 
priority is bridging the gap between 
different approaches to state aid and 
competition policy. 
Moreover, the two parties should 
agree to use a public court system for the 
settlement of their bilateral investment 
disputes (as has been done in the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement, CETA), rather 
than the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) system favoured by the US. They 
should agree, like in CETA, that the 
ultimate goal should be the creation of 
a multilateral investment framework. 
The BIT itself should ensure reciprocity 
in investment conditions¹⁴. Only after 
an EU-China BIT has been agreed, say 
by 2020, should the two partners start 
negotiations on a bilateral investment 
and trade agreement. 
The aim of the EU-China bilateral 
deal should be to improve market 
access and set high environmental, 
corporate governance, consumer safety 
and workers’ rights standards. It should 
ensure fair competition and reciprocity. 
A deal that would materially lower 
standards in the EU is not in its interest 
and should therefore be rejected. 
The EU should seek new and complete 
bilateral deals also with other countries, 
including Japan, India and the Mercosur 
bloc. Again the aim must be to ensure 
high standards for EU citizens because 
otherwise support for such deals will be 
lacking. And the aim should be to do the 
deals in a way that strengthens rather 
than weakens the global system. In trade 
and investment matters, the EU has an 
opportunity not only to uphold but even 
strengthen the global system according to 
the EU’s high standards and values.       
THE EU NEEDS TO STEP UP 
INTERNALLY TO BECOME MORE 
CREDIBLE EX TERNALLY
For the EU to assume a bigger role in 
safeguarding multilateralism and in 
forming new, and deepening old, al-
liances, a number of reforms would be re-
13. On the importance of 
structuring bilateral deals 
in a way that they do not 
undermine the multilat-
eral trading system, see 
this 2006 speech by Pascal 
Lamy: https://www.wto.
org/english/news_e/sp-
pl_e/sppl46_e.htm.
14. The European Union 
Chamber of Commerce 
(2016) European Business 
in China – Position Paper 
2016/2017, 1 September.
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15. See for example Darvas, 
Zsolt and Guntram Wolff 
(2014) ‘Europe’s social 
model and its implications 
for economic growth’, Pol-
icy Brief 2014/03, Bruegel. 
A model that combines 
flexibility and security, as 
some EU countries have 
implemented, appears 
particularly suited to the 
challenge; see Sapir, André 
(2005) ‘Globalisation and 
the reform of European 
social models’, Policy Con-
tribution, Bruegel.
16. See Aussiloux, Vincent, Ag-
nès Benassy-Quéré, Clem-
ens Fuest and Guntram 
Wolff (2017) ‘Making the 
best of the European single 
market’, Policy Contribution 
2017/03, Bruegel.
17. We would consider a 
combination of public 
investment, tax reforms 
incentivising corporate 
investment and lowering 
tax burden for low-income 
households, structural 
reforms increasing home 
ownership and wage 
increases in sectors with 
skilled labour shortages.
quired. We see three main areas in which 
reforms would increase the credibility of 
Europe’s claim to a bigger global role.
First, addressing distributional 
concerns domestically is a prerequisite 
for entering new trade arrangements. 
Europe’s social model is a major factor in 
reducing inequality and is rightly thought 
of as softening the impact of rapid change 
on citizens in an age of globalisation 
and technological change. But many 
EU countries still need to reform their 
social systems to deliver inclusive growth 
and better social protection¹⁵. The EU’s 
role should primarily be to empower its 
members to achieve desired levels of 
redistribution by effectively combatting 
tax evasion and social fraud that relate to 
the single market¹⁶. 
Second, the governance of EU trade 
and investment policy has become 
cumbersome. The recent difficulties in 
signing CETA have increased partners’ 
doubts about the EU’s ability to deliver. 
We consider it imperative that the EU 
institutions regain citizens’ trust so that 
they can negotiate trade agreements 
on citizens’ behalf. This requires more 
transparency in negotiations. It will 
also be important to ensure greater EU 
legitimacy, including through a reformed 
European Parliament. 
Third, the EU as a large open 
economy cannot sustainably run large 
current account surpluses. The large 
surpluses, and in particular Germany’s 
surplus, are a result of imbalances in 
the euro area that need to be resolved 
irrespective of the global environment. 
Strengthening domestic demand in 
Germany is pivotal¹⁷. Structural reforms 
at the national level, for example by 
addressing the debt overhang and 
remaining banking problems in other 
countries, would further boost demand. 
Such actions in surplus and former 
deficit countries will help speed up the 
normalisation of European Central Bank 
policy and strengthen the euro, thereby 
also helping to address the large euro-
area surplus.
WHAT BILATERAL ACTIONS SHOULD 
THE EU TAKE?
While future EU reforms can set new 
trends in motion in terms of the new 
global economic order, there remains the 
question of how to respond to a poten-
tially antagonistic US administration. 
At a higher level, Europe’s possible 
responses range from pure antagonism 
and retaliation, to staying the course and 
building alliances with other countries. 
Then there are more specific 
questions: what is the worst-case 
scenario in terms of US trade and 
investment discrimination and over what 
time horizons should the EU prepare to 
react? What are the implications beyond 
the purely economic relations, in terms of 
defence and cultural values?
In our view, the underlying objective 
of the EU’s response to unilateral 
measures by the US should be to sustain 
the multilateral trading system. The aim 
should be to react strongly and decisively 
but based on principles. The aims would 
be to wait until future US administrations 
change course and abandon unilateral 
actions, and to prevent an unnecessary 
escalation that would be damaging to all: 
the EU, the US and the rest of the world. 
In the event that the US terminates the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
and imposes tariffs on imports from 
Mexico that are above the US most-
favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, it would 
amount to a violation of the US’s WTO 
obligations. The EU and other WTO 
members would be affected directly 
because they have foreign direct 
investments in Mexico to serve the US 
market (see Table 3). The EU and Mexico 
(with which the EU has an FTA) and 
other WTO members that would be 
similarly affected, should then file a WTO 
complaint against the US.
In case the US introduces a form 
of DBCFT that is clearly in violation 
of WTO rules, the EU should carefully 
consider, again in collaboration with 
other WTO members, stronger measures. 
There is for example the possibility to 
adopt reciprocal measures on corporate 
taxation that would only be directed 
against the US. An alternative would be 
to use anti-subsidy measures against 
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US exports to the EU or even to third 
countries. The latter is entirely within 
the EU’s remit and one of the WTO 
legal instruments at the European 
Commission’s disposal.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It remains an open question to what 
extent Trump and his presidency are an 
acceleration of a trend or a real break 
from past US policies. In either case, but 
particularly in case of a strong break, the 
EU should rethink its global position. 
The US will remain the EU’s most natural 
partner in economic, cultural and proba-
bly military terms. But if differences grow 
significantly during the term of the cur-
rent US administration, not least because 
of different social models, the EU needs 
to stand ready to defend its interests.
The EU should prioritise measures 
that help to sustain the multilateral 
trading system. It should be firm in 
its response to the US, based on the 
principle of multilateralism. Building 
coalitions with as many players as 
possible, but especially large ones like 
China, will be important to defend 
the system. The EU could also support 
smaller partner countries in their WTO 
complaints against potential unilateral 
trade measures. 
Strengthening the collaboration 
between the EU and China, two large 
global players with a clear interest in 
and support for multilateralism, would 
seem particularly relevant for trade 
and investment. But the EU and China 
could also work closely together on 
environmental and climate matters to 
ensure that other countries do not drop 
their commitments under the Paris 
Agreement on climate change, should the 
US drop theirs.
But beyond China, the EU would 
benefit from forging alliances with other 
countries. Promoting multilateralism 
would protect smaller countries 
that naturally rely on established 
frameworks, and would help for keeping 
to existing agreements. This is of crucial 
importance for issues such as upholding 
commitments to the Paris Agreement or 
combating tax evasion and fraud at the 
global level.
Maintaining domestic support for 
trade in the EU depends on ensuring 
that trade and financial flows do not 
undermine environmental standards and 
countries’ capacities to deliver adequate 
social systems. To the extent that 
multilateralism helps the latter, it also 
helps support the pursuit of free trade.
The EU itself needs to reform. Real 
or perceived, the EU’s credibility in 
trade matters has suffered and needs 
to be restored. Moreover, the EU 
and in particular the euro area, must 
address their internal imbalances by 
reducing external trade surpluses and 
strengthening domestic growth.
Also important is what relationship 
the EU should foster with the United 
Kingdom once it leaves the EU. The 
arrival of President Trump has arguably 
increased the need for the two sides to 
reduce the Brexit-related damage that 
both could suffer. Such an agreement 
should preserve Europe’s ability to 
weigh in on world affairs, at a time 
when European values of liberal 
democracy and social market economy 
are threatened. In particular, the EU 
and the UK should be natural partners 
in supporting the multilateral system in 
areas such as trade, climate and financial 
regulation.
Finally, the EU remains a weaker 
player than its size suggests, not only 
because of its internal divisions but also 
because of its dependence on the security 
guarantee that the US provides and its 
dependence on energy imports. How and 
whether the EU and its member states 
address these two concerns is a crucial 
subject that goes beyond the scope of this 
paper.
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